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This is the first of two articles on the Ohio law of homicide. This article discusses the crimes of murder and aggravated murder, including recent statutory amendments. The
next article will examine other types of homicides and issues of causation.
Ohio divides murder into two categories: murder and aggravated murder. Aggravated murder is further divided into
five categories: (1) a purposeful killing with prior calculation
and design, (2) a purposeful killing during the commission
of specified felonies, (3) a purposeful killing of a child under
thirteen years of age, (4) a purposeful killing while the actor
is under detention, or is breaking detention, as a result of a
felony conviction, and (5) a purposeful killing of a law enforcement officer if the victim is engaged in official duties at
the time of the offense, or if the offender's specific purpose
was to kill a law enforcement officer. The death penalty may
~be imposed only for aggravated murder.
There are two categories of murder: (1) a purposeful
killing, and (2) causing a death during the commission of
specified violent felonies.
There are also two types of manslaughter: (1) voluntary
and (2) involuntary. In addition, Ohio recognizes negligent
homicide as a crime. Finally, two provisions govern vehicular homicides.
Because homicides are defined in terms of a result
(death), causation issues may arise. See 3 Katz & Giannelli,
Baldwin's Ohio Practice, Criminal Law ch. 96 (1996).

COMMON LAW HOMICIDES
At common law, homicide was defined as the killing of a
human being. There were three common law homicides:
(1) murder, (2) voluntary manslaughter, and (3) involuntary
manslaughter. There were no degrees of murder at common law; first and second degree murder are classifications
created by statute in this country during the 19th Century.
Common Law Murder
Common law murder was the unlawful killing of a human
being ''with malice aforethought." This crime included an intentional killing (express malice). Over time murder also
came to include situations of "implied malice;' of which there

were three. First, a killing committed during the commission
of a felony constituted "felony-murder:' Second, a killing in
which the accused intended to inflict great bodily injury,
rather than death, also was considered murder if death resulted. Third, a killing caused by extreme reckless conduct
was similarly classified as murder, often called "depraved
heart" or "abandoned and malignant hearf' murder. This
crime was characterized by a reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life, such as playing Russian
roulette, shooting into an occupied house, and sometimes
drag-racing related deaths.

Common Law Felony-Murder
Originally, felony-murder involved any killing, even if accidental, which occurred during the commission of a felony.
"Malice" was implied from the intent to commit the underlying felony. At the time this crime was developing, there were
few felonies, and those few were punishable by death.
Accordingly, it made little difference in many cases whether
the condemned prisoner was executed for murder or for the
predicate felony. As the number of felonies increased and
the number of felonies subject to the death penalty decreased, the common Jaw courts began to limit the scope of
the felony-murder doctrine.
At least four limitations are noteworthy. First, some
courts required that the felony be independent of the killing.
Manslaughter or aggravated battery (as lesser offenses of
murder) are not independent felonies and therefore do not
qualify as the underlying felony. 1 LaFave & Scott,
Substantive Criminai Law§ 7.5(g) (i986). Uniike rape,
arson, burglary, robbery, and kidnaping, which are independent, manslaughter and aggravated battery are said to
merge with the conduct resulting in the death. Second,
some courts mandated that the death be foreseeable; otherwise the felony was not considered the proximate cause of
the death.ld. § 7.5(d). Third, the death must occur during
the commission of the felony. This limitation created a temporal limitation, in which the beginning and end of the felony
must be defined. Since felony-murder often extended to attempts, the law of attempt frequently determined the commencement of the time period. Similarly, felony-murder
often extends to deaths caused while "fleeing" the felony;
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By statutory amendment (1996), however, homicides
now encompass the "unlawful termination of another's pregnancy:· See R.C. 2903.09(A)(definition). Although this provision was challenged on constitutional grounds, it was upheld in State v. Coleman, 124 Ohio App.3d 78, 80, 705
N.E.2d 419 (1997).
At one time, defining death was relatively simple. When
a victim's heart and lungs stopped, that person was legally
dead. However, with modern advances in medicine, "brain
death" has supplanted "respiratory" death. 1 LaFave &
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 7.1 (1986). The Ohio
Supreme Court adopted this definition in State v. Johnson,
56 Ohio St.2d 35, 40, 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978):
There was testimony at trial by both the coroner and
attending physician that the proximate cause of death
was severe head trauma as a result of an extensive
skull fracture. This evidence was uncontroverted, but
for the bare assertion that Dr. Walus decided to no
longer continue the supplemental oxygen supply
[through an artificial respirator] to the patient after four
days of testing showed brain death.
See also State v. Long, 7 Ohio App.3d 248, 250, 555 N.E.2d
(1983). Moreover, R.C. 2108.30 also defines death as
"brain death" for physician liability purposes.
Typically, proof of death is a straightforward proposition.
A coroner or forensic pathologist will testify about the autopsy. Crime scene photographs also establish the fact of
death. See 2 Giannelli & Snyder, ,Baldwin's Ohio Practice,
Evidence § 901.17 (1996) (photographs). However, if the
victim's body is not recovered, proof of death becomes
more problematic. Nevertheless, death may be proved
through circumstantial evidence, even in the absence of the
victim's body. E.g., State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150,
529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988) ("It is well-established that murder
can be proven in the absence of a body:'); State v. Dudley,
19 Ohio App.2d 14, 25, 249 N.E.2d 536 (1969) ("[U]nder
present day concepts, production of a 'body' is not absolutely essential to convict, even in a murder case:'); Perkins,
The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 Va. L. Rev. 173 (1962).

thus, it became necessary to determine a termination date
for the time of flight. Here, the common law said that once
the felon had reached a place of "temporary safety," the
felony-murder rule ceased. ld. § 7.5(f). Fourth, the death of
a cofelon was often not punishable as felony-murder if the
death was caused bv an innocent third party, such as a police officer, a victim, or a bystander. ld. § 7 .5(c). This limitation, however, did not extend to the death of an innocent
person caused by the conduct of another innocent third
party -for example, where the policeman kills a bystander
while attempting to capture the felon. In that situation, the
felon was held responsible for the death.

Statutory Changes
Modern homicide statutes frequently divide murder into
two degrees. Typically, first degree murder statutes in this
country encompass (1) "deliberate and premeditated" murders, and (2) felony-murder but limited to the most dangerous felonies- e.g., arson, robbery, burglary, rape, and kidnaping.
The "deliberation and premeditation" formula required reflection, albeit for only minutes in some jurisdictions. It encompassed a planned murder as opposed to a sudden impulse murder, which constituted second degree murder.
Note, however, that both first and second degree murder involve intentional killings. In other words, the distinction is
not between intended and unintended killings, but rather between premeditated intentional killings and unpremeditated
intentional killings. Premeditated killings were considered
more heinous, a rather questionable proposition. First-degree murder statutes in this country also often include
killings "by lying in wait, poison, or torture:' Since these
murders all require premeditation, this type of provision
could be viewed as a redundant category.
PROOF OF LIFE AND DEATH
By definition, homicide means the killing of a human
being. It is not murder to shoot a corpse, although it may be
some other crime (e.g., offenses against a corpse) and
under certain circumstances it may be attempted murder
(e.g., if the actor believed that the corpse was alive).
Accordingly, the law of homicide requires defining when life
begins and when it ends.
Under the common law, life began when the "victim" was
"born alive:· State v. Robbins, 8 Ohio St. 131, 192 (1857)
("under our statute, neither degree of criminal homicide can
be predicated upon the killing of an unborn child"). In State
v. Dickinson, 28 Ohio St.2d 65, 70-71, 275 N.E.2d 599
(1971), the Ohio Supreme Court refused to alter the common law definition of "live birth:' The defendant's car struck
another car, in which a seven-month pregnant woman was a
passenger. Prior to the accident, the fetus was viable and
capable of sustaining life. The Court wrote:
The law has long been clear that to establish the corpus delicti in the murder of a newborn child, the evidence must show that the infant was born alive .... In
the absence of a specific statute to the contrary, this
same element is essential for a conviction of vehicular
homicide in Ohio. Since the evidence in this case does
not indicate that the child was born alive, a conviction
cannot stand.
See also State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St.3d 514, 517, 584 N.E.2d
710 (1992) (parent may not be prosecuted for child endangerment for substance abuse occurring before the birth of
the child).

MURDER
Until recently, murder was defined as purposely causing
the death of another person. R.C. 2903.02(A). In 1998, a
second category of murder, a type of felony-murder, was
enacted by amendment.
Recent Amendment
R.C. 2903.02(B) defines murder to also include a death
that is the proximate result of the offender's committing or
attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony
of the first or second degree and that is not a violation of
R.C. 2903.03 (voluntary manslaughter) or R.C. 2903.04 (involuntary manslaughter). An "offense of violence" is defined
in R.C. 2901.01 (A)(9). In addition, R.C. 2903.02(C) specifies that division (B) does not apply to felonies that become
first or second degree felonies due to a prior conviction.
In effect, Ohio now has three categories of felony-murder,
depending on the seriousness of the underlying felony: (1)
aggravated murder for specified offenses (kidnaping, rape,
aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, and escape), (2) murder for
specified crimes of violence, and (3) involuntary manslaughter for other felonies.
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Related Crimes

reasonable theory of an accused's innocence in order to
support a finding of guilt:' This position was criticized as
more misleading than helpful. For example, the United
States Supreme Court commented: "[T]he better rule is that
where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for
reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect." Holland v.
United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 {1954).
In State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492
{1991), the Ohio Supreme Court overruled Kulig and its
prior position on circumstantial evidence. The Court wrote:
Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value and therefore
should be subjected to the same standard of proof.
When the state relies on circumstantial evidence to
prove an essential element of the offense charged,
there is no need for such evidence to be irreconcilable
with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to
support a conviction. Therefore, where the jury is
properly and adequately instructed as to the standards
for reasonable doubt a special instruction as to circumstantial evidence is not required.
See also State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 331, 638 N.E.2d
1023 {1994) {"[A] rule changing the quantum of proof required for conviction may be applied to trials of crimes committed before the rule was announced, without violating the
Ex Post Facto Clause:'); State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d 465,
473, 620 N.E.2d 50 {1993) {"[T]his court has rejected the
concept that circumstantial evidence must be 'irreconcilable
with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support
a conviction."').
Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to support a homicide conviction. E.g., State v. Richey, 64 Ohio
St.3d 353, 363, 595 N.E.2d 915 {1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 507 U.S. 989 {1993); State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d
19, 27,514 N.E.2d 394 {1987) {"[A] conviction based upon
purely circumstantial evidence may be just as reliable as a
conviction based on direct evidence, if not more so."); State
v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87,434 N.E.2d 1362 {1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 870 {1982).
This is true of a murder conviction even in the absence of
the victim's body. E.g., State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147,
150, 529 N.E.2d 1236 {1988) {"It is well-established that
murder can be proven in the absence of a body."); State v.
Dudley, 19 Ohio App.2d 14, 25, 249 N.E.2d 536 {1969)
{"[U]nder present day concepts, production of a 'body' is not
absolutely essential to convict, even in a murder case.");
Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 Va. L. Rev. 173
{1962).

One type of murder {Division {A), purposeful killing) is a
lesser-included-offense of aggravated murder. See
Legislative Service Commission {1973) {''This section defines murder simply as the purposeful killing of another, and
"(\the offense can thus be a lesser included offense to both
forms of aggravated murder:'); Ohio Jury Instruction §
503.015{A) {murder as a lesser included-offense). This type
of murder differs from aggravated murder in that it does not
require the additional element of "prior calculation and design;· commission of an enumerated felony, a child under 13
or law enforcement officer as the victim, or while the offender is under detention pursuant to a felony conviction.
Murder differs from voluntary manslaughter because the
latter, although a purposeful killing, must have been committed in the sudden heat of passion upon sufficient provocation. The provocation is thought to mitigate the offense.

Depraved Heart Murder
The Ohio statute does not recognize "depraved heart
murder"- a type of common-law murder, in which death is
caused by extremely reckless conduct. See 1 LaFave &
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 7 .4{a), at 201 {1986) {"A
very significant minority of the modern codes do not recognize this type of murder at all:'){citing the Ohio statute). The
Ohio involuntary manslaughter, negligent homicide, and vehicular homicide statutes cover some {but not all) of the
conduct that would have been criminalized as "depraved
hearf' murder at common law.

Mens Rea: Purpose
~

The required mental element in Division {A) is "purpose:·
One court has ruled that it is not error for an indictment to
substitute the mental element of knowledge. State v.
Thompson, No. 9-81-9 {3d Dist. Ct. App., 3-3-82). However,
under the Code's definition of purpose, the intention of the
accused must be to achieve the proscribed result -the
death of another person. Knowledge is not sufficient. See
R.C. 2901.22{A) {"A person acts purposely when it is his
specific intention to cause a certain result."). For example, a
person who plants a bomb on his own airplane in order to
collect insurance may not have the "purpose" to kill the pilot,
although the offender has knowledge that the pilot's death is
almost certain. See RC 2901.22{8) {"A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his
conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably
be of a certain nature:').

Circumstantial Evidence

I

Circumstantial evidence is frequently used in homicide
prosecutions. In many instances circumstantial evidence is
more reliable than direct evidence. See State v. Richey, 64
Ohio St.3d 353, 363, 595 N.E.2d 915 {1992) {"Indeed, circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying and
persuasive than direct evidence:'), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
989 {1993); State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 167, 555
N.E.2d 293 {1990); State v. Turner, Wright 20, 28 {1831)
{"[c]ircumstantial evidence is often the most convincing. It is
difficult to fabricate the connected links in a chain of circumstances .... It is [easier] ... to fabricate positive facts:').
Nevertheless, for a long time the Ohio Supreme Court
employed a special rule to evaluate the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases. In State v. Kulig, 37
Ohio St.2d 157, 309 N.E.2d 897 {1974) {syllabus), the Court
held that "[c]ircumstantial evidence relied upon to prove an
essential element of a crime must be irreconcilable with any

Circumstantial Evidence: Mens Rea
The intent to kill {"purpose") need not be proved by direct
testimony, but may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances, including the instrument used, its tendency to
destroy life if designed for that purpose, and the manner in
which the wound was inflicted. State v. Burke, 73 Ohio St.3d
399,653 N.E.2d 242 {1995). See also State v. Phillips, 74
Ohio St.3d 72, 82, 656 N.E.2d 643 {1995) {"A blunt force
traumatic injury to Sheila's chest bruised internal organs
and caused them to bleed. The use of such substantial
force by an adult on a three-year-old victim is certainly suffi~
cient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find a
purpose to kill:'); State v. Shue, 97 Ohio App.3d 459, 468,
646 N.E.2d 1156 {1994) {"A jury can reasonably infer that a
defendant formed the specific intent to kill from the fact that
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64 Ohio St.3d 353, 364, 555 N.E.2d 915 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 989 (1993). See also State v. Sowell, 39
Ohio St.3d 322, 331, 530 N.E.2d 1294 (1988) ("[T1he indictment is accurate in that appellant acted with prior calculation and design in killing Graham under the doctrine of
transferred intent:').

a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrument, the use of
which is likely to produce death, coupled with relevant circumstantial evidence:'); State v. Brown, 112 Ohio App.3d
583, 604, 679 N.E.2d 361 (1996) ("Further substantial evidence showed that appellant became angry with [her 8 year
old son] on the morning of his murder, struck him in the
chest causing injury, drove him to the end of Union Chapel
Road, and ran him over with her station wagon, leaving him
to die:').
The Ohio Supreme Court has written:
The law has long recognized that intent, lying as it
does within the privacy of a person's own thoughts, is
not susceptible of objective proof. The law recognizes
that intent can be determined from the surrounding
facts and circumstances, and persons are presumed
to have intended the natural, reasonable and probable
consequences of their voluntary acts. Intent "can
never be proved by the direct testimony of a third person and it need not be. It must be gathered from the
surrounding facts and circumstances:•
State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60, 656 N.E.2d 623
(1995) (quoting State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E.2d
313 (1936)(syllabus 4)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1444
(1996). The Court also wrote: "We unhesitatingly find that
the natural, reasonable and probable consequence of
Garner's having set three separate fires in an apartment occupied by six children age thirteen and under is that those
children would die. There was thus sufficient evidence to
support the jury's finding that Garner possessed the requisite mental elements of the crime of aggravated murder:· ld.

AGGRAVATED MURDER:
PRIOR CALCULATION & DESIGN
There are five types of aggravated murder: (1) a purposeful killing that is the product of prior calculation and design, (2) a purposeful killing during the commission of specified felonies, (3) a purposeful killing of a child under thirteen
years of age, (4) a purposeful killing while the actor is under
detention (or is breaking detention) as a result of a felony
conviction, and (5) a purposeful killing of a law enforcement
officer if the victim is engaged in official duties at the time of
the offense, or if the offender's specific purpose was to kill a
law enforcement officer. R.C. 2903.01. Aggravated murder
is the only capital offense in Ohio; the penalty for aggravated murder is death or life imprisonment. 3 Katz & Giannelli,
Baldwin's Ohio Practice, Criminal Law chs.115-17 (1996).
Mens Rea: "Purpose"
The first culpable mental state for all types of aggravated
murder, like murder under R.C. 2903.02, is "purpose:·
Accordingly, ihe above discussion of that mental state applies here as well. The difference between murder and the
first type of aggravated murder is the additional mental state
of "prior calculation and design;· an element thought to
demonstrate cold bloodedness.

Instructions
A trial court's instruction in a murder prosecution that the
purpose with which a person acts or brings about a result
may be determined from the manner in which it was done,
the means used, and other facts and circumstances in evidence, does not operate to relieve the prosecutor of the burden of persuasion or create a mandatory presumption.
State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 659 N.E.2d 292 (1996).
The word "presumption" or "presume" should never be used
in a jury instruction.
An instruction informing a jury that it may infer "purpose"
from the use of a deadly weapon is constitutional.
According to the Ohio Supreme Court, the trial "court used
the word 'may,' indicating that the presumption was permissive - one the jury could accept, not one that the jury was
required to accept:' State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 196,
702 N.E.2d 866 (1998)(The instruction provided: "If a
wound is inflicted upon a person with a deadly weapon in a
manner calculated to destroy life the purpose to kill may be
inferred from the use of the weapon:'). Accord State v Loza,
71 Ohio St.3d 61, 81, 641 N.E.2d 1082 (1994).

Mens Rea: "Prior Calculation and Design"
There were no degrees of murder at common law. When
first adopted in this country, first degree murder statutes
used the term "premeditation."
The substitution of the term "prior calculation and design"
in the Ohio statute in lieu of the term "premeditation," the traditional phraseology in this country, was intended to exclude
from the definition of aggravated murder those killings
where the intention is formed without some pre-planning.
See Ohio Jury Instructions § 503.01 (A) (defining prior calculation and design). Without this distinction, there is no difference between aggravated murder and murder, and juries
can be given no meaningful direction. This change in language represents a rejection of the judicial interpretation of
the former Code section, which held that murder couid be
"premeditated" even though the fatal plan was conceived
and executed on the spur of the moment; the only requirement was that the malicious purpose be formed before the
homicidal act, however short in time -"a matter of seconds:' State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964). The statute
restates the former crime of premeditated murder so
as to embody the classic concept of the planned, coldblooded killing while discarding the notion that only an
instant's prior deliberation is necessary. By judicial interpretation of the former Ohio law, murder could be
premeditated even though the fatal plan was conceived and executed on the spur of the moment.
Legislative Service Commission (1973) ("See, State v.
Schaffer, 113 Ohio App 125 (Lawrence Co App, 1960). The
section employs the phrase, "prior calculation and design;·
to indicate studied care in planning or analyzing the means
of the crime, as well as a scheme compassing the death of

Transferred Intent
When an actor aims at one person but misses and hits a
second person, the law usually holds the actor guilty of the
murder of the second person. Thus, "when one person (A)
acts (or omits to act) with intent to harm another person (B),
but because of bad aim he instead harms a third person (C)
whom he did not intend to harm, the law considers him (as it
ought) just as guilty as if he had actually harmed the intended victim:' 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §
3.12(d), at 400 (1986). This is called "transferred intent":
A's intent to kill B is transferred to C. "The doctrine of transferred intention is firmly rooted in Ohio law:· State v. Richey,
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N.E.2d 909 (1993) (" '[P]rior calculation and design' requires
a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to
kill:') (quoting Cotton).
In State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 20, 676 N.E.2d 82
(1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 143 (1997), the Ohio
Supreme Court wrote that "it is not possible to formulate a
bright-line test that emphatically distinguishes between the
presence or absence of 'prior calculation and design.'
Instead, each case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at trial." The Court held that there was sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to find prior calculation and design. As to the time interval, the Court noted
that "[e]ven though most of the evidence indicates that the
time between the jukebox incident and the shooting was
only two or three minutes, there was more than sufficient
evidence for the jury to reasonably have found that appellant, with prior calculation and design, decided to shoot
Alexander in that space of time:· Id. at 22. This statement,
however, must be read in light of other factors cited by the
Court. First, the accused and the victim had a prior hostile
relationship. Second, the accused brought a gun into the
bar where he knew the victim drank. Third, several of the
shots were fired after the victim was already wounded and
lying on the floor. As the victim tried to crawl away, the accused "walked closer and fired three or four shots into his
back." Under these circumstances, there was more than "instantaneous deliberation."
Other courts have also found short breaks in an initial
confrontation preceding a fatal shooting sufficient evidence
of prior calculation and design. In State v. Balfour, No.
45478 (8th Dist. Ct. App., 5-12-83), the defendant encountered the victim twice briefly and then went out to his car to
obtain a sawed-off shotgun, and in State v. Whitehead, No.
C-81 0183 (1st Dist. Ct. App., 1-13-82), the lapse of several
minutes between an initial fist fight and a shooting were sufficient to show prior calculation and design. For aggravated
murder, the reflection need not be long, nor the plan elaborate, but it must exist. In contrast, a court of appeals found
insufficient prior calculation and design where (1) a shooting
took place after a tussle at a bar entrance, (2) there was no
break between the fight and the shooting, and (3) the defendant did not go to the bar with the intent to kill. The court
found that the shooting occurred during "an almost 'instantaneous eruption of events,"' which the court said did not "reflect the studied analysis that must reinforce prior calculation." State v. Richardson, 103 Ohio ,Ll,pp.3d 21, 658 l'J.E.2d
321 (1995).
In determining the existence of prior calculation and design, the relevant factors include: (1) whether the accused
knew the victim prior to the crime, as opposed to a random
meeting; (2) whether the relationship between the accused
and victim was strained; (3) whether the accused used
thought and preparation to decide on a weapon or the site
of the homicide; and (4) whether the act was drawn out over
a period of time as opposed to an almost instantaneous
eruption of events. State v. Richardson, 103 Ohio App.3d
21, 658 N.E.2d 321 (1995).
See also State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d 331 , 344, 703
N.E.2d 1251 (1999) ("It was an action that required thought
on his part to place the gun at the victim's forehead, and he
took additional time to decide to pull the trigger in order to_
carry out a calculated plan to obtain money from the store.
This was not a spur-of-the moment accidental shooting on
the part of a robber."); State v. Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d 543,
570, 687 N.E.2d 685 (1997)("The events giving rise to the

the victim. Neither the degree of care nor the length of time
the offender takes to ponder the crime beforehand are critical factors in themselves, but they must amount to more
than momentary deliberation:').
The Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged that "prior
(\ calculation and design" is a more stringent element than the
prior judicial interpretation of "premeditation:' In State v.
Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 11, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979), the
Court recognized that the intent of the legislature was ''to require more than a few moments of deliberation ... and to require a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill." The Court went on to say that "instantaneous
deliberation is not sufficient to constitute 'prior calculation
and design."' ld. This does not mean, however, that a considerable time lapse between the time a decision to kill is
made and the actual killing is required. Nor, does the Ohio
Supreme Court focus upon the details of the plan and the
care taken in its execution as some states have. E.g.,
People v. Anderson, 70 Cal.2d 15, 447 P.2d 942 (1968).
For example, in Cotton, the defendant ran from a store
and was pursued by two officers. After striking one of the
officers who had caught him, the defendant grabbed that officer's gun and shot the second officer. Cotton then wrestled the first officer to the ground and fired two shots at him.
The defendant next ran to his car where he came upon the
. second officer who was wounded. The defendant assumed
a shooting position and fired the fatal shot into the second
officer. Obviously, the defendant did not plan the killing; nor
did he have considerable time to think about his actions.
The Court nevertheless affirmed an aggravated murder conviction, holding that the evidence revealed "sufficient time
and opportunity between the appearance of the police offir) cers on the scene and the fatal shot ... for the planning of
the killing and for the planning to constitute prior calculation:' See also State v. Stoudemire, 118 Ohio App.3d 752,
757-58, 694 N.E.2d 86 (1997) ("Instantaneous deliberation
is insufficient to constitute prior calculation and design .... In
effect, he maintains that the circumstances of the killing
were so poorly thought out that no rational person would
have premeditated them. The absence of foresight does not
necessarily prove the lack of a coherent plan to murder a
person-there is such a thing as a bad plan. One could
also conclude that defendant simply did not care who saw
him commit the murder ....").
In another case, State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 7879, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979), the Supreme Court upheid an
aggravated murder conviction where an angry defendant
assaulted his victim in the hallway of the defendant's apartment house. While the victim was on the floor, the defendant rushed into his own apartment and retrieved a long
knife or sword from under his mattress. He then returned to
the hall, where his victim was still on the floor asking to be
let alone, and stabbed the victim to death. In rejecting the
defense contention that death occurred after only momentary deliberation during a heated brawl, the Court stated
that the initial aggression followed by the defendant's return
to his apartment to secure the weapon, which he used instants later, was sufficient to support a finding of "prior calculation and design:' See also State v. Awkal, 76 Ohio St.3d
324, 330, 667 N.E.2d 960 (1996) ("Prior to the shooting,
I Awkal threatened to kill his wife and her family, and bought
a gun:'); State v. Ballew, 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 250, 667
N.E.2d 369 (1996) ("Ballew 'adopted a plan to kill."')( quoting
State v. Toth, 52 Ohio St.2d 206, 213, 371 N.E.2d 831
(1977)); State v. D'Ambrosio, 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 196, 616
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sponding to a fire caused by the defendants. The court of
appeals held that where an actor has actual knowledge that
other persons are exposed to a substantial risk of serious
physical harm caused by the burning of a building, the element of purpose to kill may be "presumed" from the natural
and probable consequences of the actor's conduct.
Arsonists have traditionally been held culpable under the
common law for the resultant death of firefighters because it
is foreseeable that firefighters will respond to a fire alarm
and risk death combating the fire. The court in Thompson
asked whether the deaths were so remote
that such deaths could not be a natural and probable
consequence of the act of arson? How do you show
purpose such as we have here, for it is a rare call indeed for a defendant to step forward and say I intended to kill? Purpose certainly is shown by the acts,
conduct and the knowledge exhibited in carrying out
whatever is done by the person.
Although it may be sound policy to hold arsonists responsible for the deaths of firefighters resulting from an arsonist's
recklessness, it is not consistent with the aggravated murder
statute, which limits culpability to deaths that are purposely
caused. The defendants in Thompson were outrageously
reckless; however, they did not purposely cause the death
of the firefighter.

death of each victim may have been of a short duration, but
the duration of the events was quite long enough for appellant to have conceived of, adopted, and executed a calculated plan to kill each victim:').
AGGRAVATED MURDER: FELONY-MURDER
The difference between murder and this type of aggravated murder is the commission of one of the enumerated
felonies. This type of aggravated murder includes a purposeful killing (1) during a kidnaping, rape, aggravated
arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, or escape; (2) an attempt to commit one of
these enumerated offenses; or (3) while fleeing after committing or attempting to commit one of these enumerated offenses.
Related Crimes
The culpable mental state for this type of aggravated
murder, like murder under R.C. 2903.02, is "purpose:· See
State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 36, 553 N.E.2d 576 (1990)
("Murder, under R.C. 2903.02, is any purposeful killing. As
such, it is clearly a lesser included offense of aggravated
murder under R.C. 2903.01 (B):')
In Ohio, involuntary manslaughter "is a lesser included offense to aggravated murder:· State v. Williams, 7 4 Ohio
St.3d 569, 57 4, 660 N.E.2d 724 (1996). See also State v.
Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286 (1988) (syllabus, para. 1). It is defined as causing the death of another
as the proximate result of committing a felony. The primary
difference between aggravated murder and involuntary
manslaughter is that the former requires the purpose to kill,
while involuntary manslaughter only requires a death as the
proximate result of a felony. State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio
St.3d 38, 630 N.E.2d 339 (1994). The killing need not be
purposeful.
An instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesserincluded-offense of aggravated murder is justified only when
the jury can reasonably find against the prosecution on the
element of purpose and still find that the defendant's act
proximately caused the death. State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio
St.3d 38, 630 N.E.2d 339 (1 994). A defendant is entitled to
an instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary
manslaughter, where there is evidence of the defendant's intoxication while committing an armed robbery and homicide
because intoxication might lead a jury to conclude that the
defendant did not act with the purpose to kiii. State v.
Young, No. C-830757 (1st Dist. Ct. App., 5-14-86).

Time Limitation
The statute requires that the killing occur "while" the
felony is being committed or attempted, or "while" the actor
is "fleeing immediately" thereafter.
The term "while" does not indicate ... that the killing
must occur at the same instant as the attempted rape,
or that the killing must have been caused by the attempt, but, rather, indicates that the killing must be directly associated with the attempted rape as part of
one continuance occurrence .... The evidence here
showed that the murders were associated with the kidnaping, robbery, and rapes "as part of one continuous
occurrence."
State v. Gooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 23, 544 N.E.2d 895
(1 989) (quoting State v. Cooper, 52 Ohio St.2d 163, 179-80,
370 N.E.2d 725 (1977}). See also State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio
St.3d 131, 131 32, 592 N.E.2d 1376 (1 992) (defendant did
not rob his victim until hours after he had stabbed her and
case reflects that he did not stab her in order to rob her).
In State v. Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 577, 660 N.E.2d
724 (1 996), the Supreme Court applied the felony-murder
rule, even though the murder was accomplished before the
attempted rape and the evidence did not suggest that the
intent to rape was formed prior to the fatal assault. The
term ''while," as used in the felony-murder statute, means
that the death must occur as part of the acts leading up to,
during, or immediately after the felony. Neither the felonymurder statute nor the case law requires that the intent to
commit the felony precede the murder:
[E]ach of the crimes of which Williams was convicted
occurred during one continuous incident. Accordingly,
Williams should not be able to escape the felony-murder rule by claiming the rape was merely an afterthought .... In this case, the murder of Mr. Melnick
was "associated" with the attempted rape of Mrs.
Melnick "as part of one continuous occurrence:·
See also State v. McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 440-41, 700
N.E.2d 596 (1998) ("Because the killing and predicate

Mens Rea: "Purpose"
Ohio's variation of felony-murder differs from commonlaw felony-murder as well as the statutory felony-murder
recognized in most states. The Ohio rule does not punish
accidental deaths committed during the commission of the
enumerated offenses. The statute limits culpability to purposeful killings and thus requires an intent to kill. "The requirement that the killing must be purposeful is retained:'
See Legislative Service Commission (1 973) ("The section
expands upon the former offense of felony murder by listing
kidnaping and escape, in addition to rape, arson, robbery
and burglary, as the felonies during which a purposeful
killing constitutes aggravated murder.").
However, in State v. Thompson, 55 Ohio App.2d 17, 22,
379 N.E.2d 245 (1 977), the language of the statute was ignored. In that case, arsonists were held culpable for aggravated murder in the death of a firefighter, who died while re-
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only an instruction, not a substantive change.
In In re Washington, 81 Ohio St.3d 337, 341, 691 N.E.2d
285 (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court examined the mens
rea ("purpose") as applied to an accomplice. "Washington
and four others planned and rehearsed an armed robbery.
They intended to scare the victim into complying with their
demands by brandishing a weapon, as it turn out, Watkins's
loaded shotgun. Watkins's shotgun had been demonstrated
to be capable of firing when Robinson shot the windshield of
a parked car. Based on this and other evidence in the
record, ... a rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of intent to kill proven beyond a reasonable
doubt:' The Court held that the 1981 amendment was consistent with State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St.2d 155, 165, 400
N.E.2d 375 (1980}, in which the Court had held that a "jury
can infer an aider and abettor's purpose to kill where the
facts show that the participants in a felony entered into a
common design and either the aider or abettor knew that an
inherently dangerous instrumentality was to be employed to
accomplish the felony or the felony and the manner of its
accomplishment would be reasonable likely to produce
death:'

felony need not be simultaneous in order to constitute a
felony-murder, the technical completion of one before the
commission of the other does not remove a murder from the
ambit of R.C. 2903.01 (B):')("R.C. 2903.01 (B) does notrequire that the felony be the motive for the killing:');State v.
'\ Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 570, 687 N.E.2d 685
(1997)("[A]ppellant urges that the term 'while,' as that term
appears in R.C. 2903.01 (B) and 2929.04(A)(7), requires
proof that he intended to rob his victims at the time he killed
them. However, in prior cases, this court has rejected any
[such] notion ....");State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 678
N.E.2d 891 (1997) (Williams "rejected any notion that R.C.
2903.01 (B) and 2929.04(A)(7) require proof that the offender formed the intent to commit the pertinent underlying
felony before or during the commission of the acts which resulted in the murder victim's death:').

,~

Accomplice Liability
The 1981 amendment addressed the felony-murder culpability of an accomplice in the felony. Culpability for aggravated murder under the felony-murder statute requires that
the aider and abettor have the specific intent to cause
death. There can be no presumption, conclusive or otherwise, of the specific intent (purpose to kill) merely because
the offender participated in a crime "by force and violence or
because the offense and the manner of its commission
would be likely to produce death:' R.C. 2903.01 (D). This
language appears to reject the position taken by the Ohio
Supreme Court in State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St.2d 48, 358
N.E.2d 1062 (1976), modified, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), which stated that an aider and abettor may be found
to have the purpose to kill by engaging in a common design
to commit robbery where the manner of its commission
would be reasonably likely to produce death. The language
of the amendment seems to satisfy the concerns of the
United States Supreme Court which, though not addressing
the culpability issue, concluded that the Eighth
Amendment's constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment precludes imposition of the death
penalty on an aider and abettor who (1) does not himself
kill, (2) does not attempt to kill, (3) does not intend that a
killing occur, or (4) does not intend that lethal force be used.
RC 2903.01 (D) was deleted by statutory amendment in
1998. The deletion may be negligible because it involved

1997 AMENDMENT
A 1997 amendment added a third type of aggravated
murder: the purposeful killing of a child under thirteen years
of age at the time of the offense. The death penalty statute
was also amended at the same time. See R.C.
2929.04(A)(9).
1998 AMENDMENT
A 1998 amendment added two more types of aggravated
murder: (1) a purposeful killing while under detention or
breaking detention (as defined in 2921.01) as a result of a
having been found guilty or having plead guilty to a felony,
and (2) a purposeful killing of a law enforcement officer (as
defined in 2911.01) with knowledge or reasonable cause to
know that the victim was a law enforcement officer and if either (a) the victim was engaged in official duties at the time
of the offense or (b) the offender's specific purpose was to
kill a law enforcement officer.

7

